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Affirmative action measures within the workplace seek to ensure 
equal employment opportunities and create a workforce that is 
representative of South African society. Accordingly, employers 
need to ensure that the substantive goal of equality is achieved 
when implementing affirmative action. One of the challenges 
faced by employers is the choice of beneficiary from designated 
groups which is diverse and unequal within itself. This paper 
seeks to address this challenge by looking at the definition given 
to beneficiaries of affirmative action and the concept of multi 
layered disadvantage within the Employment Equity Act. The 
paper will focus on the decision in Naidoo v Minister of Safety 
and Security and National Commissioner of the South African 
Police Service which is an example of the disadvantages 
experienced by members of the designated groups who are also 
part of a minority group within the designated groups. Particular 
focus will be placed on the disadvantages experienced by a black 
female who is also part of a minority. This paper highlights the 
multi-layered nature of disadvantage experienced by such 
members of the designated groups and the need to ensure that 
new forms of disadvantage are not created in the implementation 
of affirmative action policies by using a situation sensitive 
approach. It argues that affirmative action as a means to an end 
needs to evolve with the understanding that it functions within an 
ever changing social and economic environment. If such 
changes are ignored the true beneficiaries of affirmative action 
will not be given recognition and the desired end of creating a 
workforce representative of South African society together with 
the goal of substantive equality cannot be realised. 
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1 Introduction 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa1 through section 23 paved 
the way towards addressing the inequality and discrimination that exists in 
the South African labour market. This is in addition to the overarching right 
in section 9 guaranteeing equality for all South Africans. This right is a 
powerful and robust right which takes cognisance of the inequalities of the 
past and makes provision for positive State action2 as a necessary 
constitutional tool towards advancing equality.3 
The Employment Equity Act4 was formulated to give meaning and content 
to the right to equality within the private sphere of the workplace.5 To 
achieve equality, the EEA seeks to break down barriers to employment 
experienced by members of the designated groups,6 to create a 
representative workforce,7 and to transform the workplace into an area 
governed by principles of equality through the application of affirmative 
action. In terms of section 15 of the EEA, affirmative action measures are 
... measures designed to ensure that suitably qualified people from designated 
groups have equal opportunities and are equitably represented across all 
occupational categories and levels in the workforce of a designated employer. 
In terms of section 1 a designated employer includes an employer who 
employs 50 or more employees, or has a total annual turnover as reflected 
in Schedule 4 of the Act, and also municipalities and organs of state. 
Part of the process of implementing affirmative action measures requires a 
designated employer to identify beneficiaries of affirmative action, which 
section 1 of the EEA defines as members of the designated groups, 
comprised of either black people or women or people with disabilities. "Black 
people" are defined as Africans, Coloureds, Indians and (a more recent 
addition) those of Chinese descent.8 
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1  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter Constitution). 
2  Constitution s 9(2). 
3  Albertyn and Goldblatt "Equality" 35-1. 
4  Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (hereinafter EEA). 
5  McGregor 2005 Codicillus 2. 
6  EEA s 5. 
7  EEA s 42(a). 
8  Chinese Association v Minister of Labour (TPD) unreported case number 59251/2007 
of 18 June 2008. 
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Equality implies equal treatment of all persons who would also theoretically 
be on the same footing.9 However, because of the particular historical 
inequalities experienced by the designated groups generally, and within the 
labour market, the goal of "equality" will not be realised with "identical 
treatment in all circumstances".10 This is particularly relevant to the 
members of the designated groups, who, although identified as 
beneficiaries of employment equity, are not on an equal footing amongst 
themselves, a fact which gives rise to the notion of "compounded or multiple 
discrimination" as referred to by McGregor.11 
The EEA, however, fails to acknowledge that there may be intersections 
between the members of the groups, in that a member may be 
disadvantaged on more than one of the specified grounds at the same 
time.12 For example, women, as members of one of the designated groups, 
could experience disadvantage in equality on the basis of race, socio-
economic status, or minority status in addition to gender. Thus, although the 
designated group includes both white and black women, black women in 
this case are not on an equal footing with white women, because in addition 
to the gender disadvantage, black women are also disadvantaged by virtue 
of race.13 The classification of the "designated groups" suggests that gender 
and race are treated as if they are "mutually exclusive",14 and there is no 
overt contemplation that the two areas of disadvantage may apply to the 
same person.15 Therefore, in the situation of black women, their 
disadvantage should not only be seen from the singular perspective of 
gender or race, but rather as a combination of the two.16 This intersection 
between race and gender creates a dual disadvantage that is a unique and 
complex type of inequality, and one which is not easily dismantled.17 If there 
is lack of recognition of these intersections and the disadvantages that 
follow, then in the current example discrimination on the basis of race would 
be viewed from a black male perspective and discrimination on the basis of 
gender from a white female perspective, leaving black females to enjoy 
protection only if their interests are aligned with one of the two 
perspectives.18 
                                            
9  Pretorius 2001 Max Planck-Institut 404. 
10  Pretorius 2001 Max Planck-Institut 404.  
11 McGregor 2005 Codicillus 5. 
12  Dupper 2008 SAJHR 425, 426. 
13  Dupper 2008 SAJHR 426. 
14  Crenshaw 1989 U Chi Legal F 139. 
15  Crenshaw 1989 U Chi Legal F 139. 
16  Crenshaw 1989 U Chi Legal F 140. 
17  Albertyn and Goldblatt "Equality" 35-2. 
18  Crenshaw 1989 U Chi Legal F 143. 
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The Constitution on the other hand recognises the complexity of 
disadvantage that results from South Africa's diverse population and that 
there are intersections within the designated groups, as is evident in section 
9 in the phrase "one or more of the following grounds…". Since the focus of 
the redress is to ensure that members of vulnerable groups are protected 
and not subjected to further injustice, it would be contrary to the Constitution 
to disregard a situation where a member of a designated group is 
disadvantaged on two or more fronts. If affirmative action does not consider 
the multiple disadvantages that some members of the designated groups 
face, there is a risk that new inequalities may arise.19 The Constitution 
provides for the achievement of substantive equality,20 which cannot be 
achieved without an acknowledgment of the multi-layered disadvantage that 
could be experienced by members of the designated groups, which impacts 
on the ability of such persons to compete within the workplace.21 
A further example of multi-layered disadvantage is the inequality 
experienced by minority members within the larger disadvantaged groups, 
which is visible in the case of Naidoo v Minister of Safety and Security and 
National Commissioner of the South African Police Service.22 This note will 
focus on the multi-layered disadvantage facing a female member of the 
designated groups who is also a member of a minority group, specifically 
from the point of view of an Indian female, working within a male-dominated 
profession. Further, the inequality that results from the lack of recognition of 
the multi-layered disadvantage faced by members of the designated groups 
in the employment setting will be highlighted. The factors an employer 
needs to consider to avoid the creation of further disadvantage within the 
designated groups in the application of affirmative action will be discussed, 
with specific focus on the issues surrounding unfair discrimination in the 
implementation of the employment equity plan. 
2 Facts of the case 
In April 2009 the South African Police Service (SAPS) advertised various 
vacancies at national and provincial levels. These included five positions for 
Cluster Commanders in the Gauteng region. Ms Naidoo (the Applicant) 
applied for the position of Cluster Commander for Krugersdorp and was 
shortlisted for the position.23 After considering her application and 
performance during a two-day assessment process, the selection panel, at 
                                            
19  Mare 2011 Transformation 63. 
20  Pretorius 2001 Max Planck-Institut 404.  
21 Albertyn and Goldblatt "Equality" 35-1. 
22 Naidoo v Minister of Safety and Security and National Commissioner of the South 
African Police Service 2013 5 BLLR 490 (LC) (hereafter Naidoo). 
23  Naidoo paras 2-3. 
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provincial level, placed the Applicant second in the list of candidates that 
applied for the post.24 In June 2009 the provincial panel recommended the 
promotion of the Applicant based on her score and in line with addressing 
gender equity goals within the force. The highest scoring candidate, a black 
male, was recommended for a similar position elsewhere.25 
Despite the provincial panel's recommendation, however, the Applicant's 
appointment was not confirmed because it was alleged that her appointment 
would not enhance employment equity and would not achieve the service 
delivery objectives of the SAPS. An African male was appointed instead, 
despite his scoring less than the Applicant.26 The Applicant averred that the 
targets in the SAPS' Employment Equity Plan (hereinafter "equity plan") 
"were arbitrary and therefore unfair" and ensured that she could never be 
promoted to a higher rank.27 This was due to the targets formulated by the 
SAPS on the basis of the national demographics of the economically active 
population as well as the target for gender representivity. 
The Respondents, the Minister of Safety and Security and the National 
Commissioner of the SAPS, defended their decision by arguing that it had 
been made in line with affirmative action in terms of the EEA and the 
inherent requirements of the job, and not only in response to the numeric 
targets set in the equity plan.28 The equity plan set out certain numeric 
targets of 79 per cent for Africans; 9.6 per cent for white; 8.9 per cent for 
coloured; and 2.5 per cent for Indians.29 The percentages were prescribed 
according to the Census Report of 2001, and were derived from national 
demographics.30 The gender targets in the plan were not broken down by 
race, but were set out as 70 per cent male and 30 per cent female, despite 
the fact that 51 per cent of the population was female according to the 
Census Report.31 The court noted that no reason was given as to why the 
equity plans' target for women was only 30 per cent.32 
3 The court's analysis of the EEA 
The court held that although the appointment and promotion of employees 
fell within the prerogative of employers, they were nevertheless constrained 
by law. It correctly stated that both the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and 
                                            
24  Naidoo para 4. 
25  Naidoo para 5. 
26  Naidoo para 6. 
27  Naidoo para 8. 
28  Naidoo para 9. 
29  Naidoo para 14. 
30  Naidoo paras 14-15. 
31  Naidoo paras 15-17. 
32  Naidoo para 17. 
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the EEA require that employers treat employees fairly and do not unfairly 
discriminate on the basis of race and/or gender.33 The court held further that 
it would intervene if it found that a decision of an employer was irrational, 
"capricious or arbitrary, or displayed bias, malice or fraud, or [even if the 
employer] failed to apply his or her mind, or unfairly discriminated".34 In 
addition, it said that affirmative action sought to prefer a member of the 
designated groups in order to achieve substantive (our emphasis) equality, 
and this goal necessitated a differentiation between people.35 
4 Respondents' reasons for non-appointment 
The Respondents provided various reasons for not appointing the Applicant 
to the position applied for. One of them was that the Applicant did not comply 
with the inherent requirements of the job.36 The court, however, found that 
there were no inherent requirements for the position.37 
The Respondents also questioned the Applicant's capability of ensuring that 
the Krugersdorp Cluster, under her supervision, would meet their "service 
delivery objectives".38 The court found little justification for this statement, 
considering the qualifications and experience of the Applicant39 as well as 
the panel's contention that the Applicant was "competent, experienced and 
equal to the task".40 
They further justified the appointment of the male candidate by explaining 
that the candidate would have made an immediate contribution as opposed 
to the Applicant who, they said, would "need tutoring".41 The court also 
found no basis for this contention, as the experience of both the Applicant 
and the candidate appointed was similar, even though the appointed 
candidate had scored slightly higher in that regard.42 
5 Respondents' argument against unfair discrimination 
The Applicant argued that the failure by the Respondents to appoint her 
amounted to unfair discrimination.43 The Respondents' main argument, that 
                                            
33  Naidoo paras 68-69. 
34  Naidoo para 70. 
35  Naidoo para 72. 
36  Naidoo para 74. 
37  Naidoo paras 78-79. 
38  Naidoo para 107. 
39  Naidoo para 110. 
40  Naidoo para 101. 
41  Naidoo para 36. 
42  Naidoo para 81. 
43  Naidoo para 8. 
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the Applicant's non-appointment was not unfair discrimination, was 
articulated in their submission that 
... it was not about [her] and her abilities or experience but about the employment 
equity profile that was “dictating” the decisions to be made at the time.44 
The Respondents contended that the appointment of an African male fell 
squarely into the equity plan as at the time there were not enough Africans 
represented in the SAPS, whereas Indian females were "ideally" 
represented. Due to the calculations used to identify the representivity of 
Indian females required, with the target of 30 per cent females in the SAPS, 
the ideal was for zero Indian females to be appointed. It was clear that the 
Respondents were thinking primarily of filling numerical quotas without 
consideration of the impact that their decision would have on a member of 
the designated groups such as the Applicant, who was also part of a minority 
group.45 
To address this contention, the court turned to the legislative provisions in 
terms of section 9 of the Constitution and section 6 of the EEA.46 The court 
also referred to the Constitutional Court case of Minister of Finance v 
Frederick Jacobus van Heerden,47 where it was held that in an evolving 
democratic society it is important that the application of affirmative action 
should be fair.48 The court recognised that besides the categories of race, 
gender and class differentiation there are further categories of differentiation 
that prevail and lead to new "patterns of disadvantage".49 Thus, in order to 
prevent this further discrimination a "situation-sensitive" approach should be 
applied.50 This will be discussed in more detail later in the paper. 
The court provided that, in terms of Van Heerden, it must first be determined 
"whether a measure targets persons or categories of persons who have 
been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination";51 second, whether the 
measure will achieve the protection or advancement of these persons; and 
third, whether the measure promotes equality.52 The court further pointed 
out that not only does the EEA preclude unfair discrimination, but it also 
                                            
44  Naidoo para 110. 
45  Naidoo para 35. 
46  Naidoo paras 113-114. 
47  Minister of Finance v Frederick Jacobus Van Heerden 2004 12 BLLR 1181 (CC) 
(hereafter Van Heerden). 
48  Naidoo para 116. 
49  Naidoo para 116. 
50  Naidoo para 116. 
51  Naidoo para 116. 
52  Naidoo para 116. 
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seeks to advance the constitutional values of non-racialism and non-
sexism.53 
Shaik J further held: 
... it is important in analysing an affirmative action measure to examine the 
measure from the perspective of the group to be advantaged. An analysis from 
the vantage of the group to be disadvantaged is to miss the point of affirmative 
action and give undue focus to the rights and interests of this group.54 
He noted that in the circumstances of the case, focusing on the interests of 
the larger designated groups could exclude minority groups within the 
designated groups.55 In applying the requirements in the Van Heerden to 
the case, the court held that the SAPS equity plan did seek to promote the 
employment of persons who were previously disadvantaged within the 
designated groups56 in terms of the EEA, but no consideration was being 
given to the differences present within the designated groups. The court 
then considered whether the measures were designed to protect or advance 
such persons.57 The court held that the equity plan had not been designed 
to achieve a diverse workforce "broadly representative of the South African 
community",58 as the gender division of 70 per cent male and 30 per cent 
female favoured men over women and was not representative of the 
nationally and regionally economically active population in terms of s 
42(a)(i) of the EEA.59 (This was especially noteworthy in the context of the 
fact that females constitute the majority of the population.60) Its effect was 
in fact exclusionary.61 In terms of race, the quota of 2.5 per cent for Indians, 
fed into the gender formula, gave zero as the target for the employment of 
Indian females, thereby excluding the Applicant from the designated groups 
so that she would never be appointed beyond her existing rank. The 
existence of this target was the respondents' reason for not appointing her.62 
Shaik J held that the "very purpose of employment equity is to redress the 
effect of past discrimination suffered by members of the designated group" 
and that "its purpose is not to create new de facto barriers of employment".63 
The judge further held that the EEA did not provide for disparate treatment 
of members of the designated groups on the basis of degrees (our 
                                            
53  Naidoo para 117. 
54  Naidoo para 121. 
55  Naidoo para 121. 
56  Naidoo para 127. 
57  Naidoo para 128. 
58  Naidoo para 132. 
59  Naidoo para 133 
60  Naidoo paras 180-181. 
61  Naidoo para 140. 
62 Naidoo paras 135, 147. 
63  Naidoo para 158. 
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emphasis) of disadvantage suffered in the past, within and between 
members of the designated groups.64 The EEA also did not recognise the 
notion of multiple disadvantages, which is presently the condition of South 
African women such as the Applicant, who had suffered disadvantage on 
the basis of race, gender and minority status.65 
The court nevertheless considered the situation where: 
... to achieve substantive equality and "equitable representation" for a group 
within the designated group to be advanced whilst another [is] disadvantaged. 
The disadvantage to be endured by the latter group is incidental to the purpose 
of promoting substantive equality. The disadvantage suffered is in pursuit of a 
higher purpose and to the extent that the higher purpose is realised, the 
disadvantaged group also benefits. Thus advantage and disadvantage cannot be 
seen in a narrow context bound by the moment. A situation-sensitive approach is 
required.66 
Shaik J then provided that the SAPS plan based on numeric targets was not 
broadly representative of the South African workforce and was in fact 
creating a barrier that would create a new path of discrimination for 
minorities within the designated groups.67 This was indicated in the situation 
in which the Applicant found herself. She would be disadvantaged on the 
basis of both her race and her gender68 because the plan itself created 
"degrees of disadvantage", something not envisioned by the goal of 
employment equity.69 The equity plan effectively barred her from further 
advancement. It was for this reason that the court provided for a situation-
sensitive approach. 
Shaik J concluded his judgement by stating: 
... whilst the impugned affirmative action measure is indeed designed to protect 
and advance members of the designated group, it has as its focus a much too 
narrow definition of the designated group and it is a feature of the flawed design 
that it is exclusionary rather than inclusive to a significant degree for the case of 
women; and in the case of Indians and Indian females it excludes them entirely 
and in doing so sets up an employment barrier.70 
The court, took a situation-sensitive approach by looking at the specific 
circumstances of the SAPS, its historical context and the position of the 
Applicant as a member of a minority group and a female.71 The SAPS' 
traditionally male-dominated workforce was part and parcel of what the 
                                            
64  Naidoo para 159. 
65  Naidoo para 142. 
66  Naidoo para 160. 
67  Naidoo paras 164-165. 
68  Naidoo para 164. 
69  Naidoo para 165. 
70  Naidoo para 209. 
71  Naidoo para 172. 
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affirmative action policies were trying to redress.72 The appointment of a 
male candidate where a female candidate from the designated groups was 
not only on par but better qualified, in terms of the scores achieved on the 
assessments highlighted the tendency to create new paths of 
discrimination.73 A closer look at the situation showed that the overall goal 
of affirmative action might be achieved on the surface but the substantive 
reason for affirmative action was ignored.74 
6 Analysis of the decision 
In the analysis of the decision, focus is placed on the issues discussed by 
the court which have an impact on the implementation of affirmative action 
by designated employers.  
6.1 Constitutional standard to affirmative action 
In analysing affirmative action plans, the question that must always be 
asked is whether the impact of the plan "furthers the constitutional goal of 
equality or not".75 This implies that there must be a standard against which 
affirmative action plans must be measured. However, the decision as to 
what constitutional standard must be used has been the subject of debate.76 
McGregor discusses the controversy around the application of different 
tests in the relationship between the right to equality and the application of 
affirmative action by employers, and further analyses three tests, namely 
the fairness, rationality and proportionality tests.77 In an in-depth analysis of 
the recent Constitutional Court judgement of South African Police Services 
v Solidarity obo Barnard,78 Albertyn notes that the court failed to develop "a 
common understanding for evaluating employment-related affirmative 
action" under the EEA and within the context of the established provisions 
of substantive equality within the Constitution.79 Each test is briefly 
considered separately. 
The fairness test focuses on section 9(3) of the Constitution and requires a 
"flexible but situation-sensitive approach to the allegation of unfair 
discrimination",80 which McGregor argues is necessary in order to prevent 
the creation of new disadvantages.81 The fairness of an action of redress 
                                            
72  Naidoo para 171. 
73  Naidoo para 184. 
74  Naidoo para 175. 
75  Pretorius 2001 Max Planck-Institut 405. 
76  McGregor 2013 TSAR 650; Albertyn 2015 SALJ 711. 
77  McGregor 2013 TSAR 650. 
78  SAPS v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) (hereafter Barnard (CC)). 
79  Albertyn 2015 SALJ 711. 
80  McGregor 2013 TSAR 652. 
81  McGregor 2013 TSAR 652; and Pretorius 2001 Max Planck-Institut 405. 
H PAPACOSTANTIS & M MUSHARIWA PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  11 
such as affirmative action is held to be measured by the impact of the action 
on the complainant who claims unfair discrimination, and the employer has 
the onus of proving that the application is fair.82 Determining fairness 
involves a "balancing act" of the historic and social context of the inequality 
suffered, its impact on the complainant in terms of his or her particular 
history and vulnerability in the context of the “nature and purpose of the 
discriminatory practice”, and whether the practice "ameliorates or adds to 
group disadvantage in a real life context" in the light of the values of the 
Constitution.83 Fairness in the context of the application of affirmative action 
is needed to avoid the creation of new inequalities, and such action should 
not be exercised in an arbitrary and unfair manner.84 In addition to 
considering the complainants position: 
[p]rocesses of differential treatment which have the legitimate purpose of bringing 
about real equality should not be undertaken in a manner which gratuitously and 
insensitively offends and marginalises persons identified as belonging to groups 
who previously enjoyed advantage.85 
An unnecessarily unreasonable impact on the rights of non-designated 
groups could render affirmative action unfair or unjustifiable.86 
In the Naidoo case the SAPS rigidly applied affirmative action without taking 
account of the history and vulnerability of members of the designated 
groups within the specific workforce. In applying their affirmative action plan 
the SAPS did not consider the “real life” context of the SAPS and the various 
members of the designated groups within that context as outlined by 
McGregor. Considering the impact of affirmative action on the complainant, 
in the Naidoo case the Applicant because of her minority status encountered 
"new pattern[s] of disadvantage and discrimination"87 which effectively 
barred her from further advancement in the workplace. Thus substantive 
equality was not achieved because of the disregard for the Applicant's 
particular context. The Naidoo case thus presents the dynamic of two 
different members of the designated groups each competing for a position, 
but each coming from different vantage points of inequality. 
It should be noted that the fairness test was rejected by Van der 
Westhuizen88 in Barnard, who argued: 
                                            
82  Pretorius 2001 Max Planck-Institut 415.  
83  McGregor 2013 TSAR 652-654. 
84  Pretorius 2001 Max Planck-Institut 415. 
85  City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 3 BCLR 257 (CC) para 123; also see Pretorius 
2001 Max Planck-Institut 415. 
86  Pretorius 2001 Max Planck-Institut 415. 
87  Naidoo para 186. 
88 Barnard (CC) paras 157-158. 
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I am somewhat sceptical of a fairness standard when dealing with the 
constitutional validity of the implementation of section 9(2) measures. If “fairness” 
here relates to the unfair discrimination prohibition in section 9(3), relying on it 
with regard to affirmative measures under section 9(2) may risk internal 
inconsistency.89 
This is due to the fact that in terms of the precedent set by Van Heerden, 
section 9(2) provides a clear defence against unfair discrimination. The 
Judge notes that he would rather look at: 
... whether the impact of the implementation of a section 9(2) measure on other 
rights is more severe than is necessary to achieve its purpose.90 
The second test is the proportionality test. This focuses on the limitation of 
rights and how to deal with rights within constitutional transformation where 
it requires "more than good reasons for state actions in the abstract".91 It is 
about the legitimate justification by the state where there is limitation of 
rights, which is to be done in a "contextually sensitive" manner.92 In 
Barnard93 it was held that proportionality involves a "case‐sensitive and 
concrete assessment of competing rights" in which a "right or value is not 
compromised more than is necessary, in the context of a constitutional state 
founded on dignity, equality and freedom in which government has positive 
duties to uphold such values".94 In Naidoo the SAPS' affirmative action plan 
would fail the proportionality test since the facts show that the decision not 
to appoint the Applicant was not "contextually sensitive" and had the 
appearance of a token affirmative action measure instead of achieving 
substantive equality. 
The third test is the rationality test established by the court in Van Heerden, 
and also referred to in Naidoo. The test assists in determining whether the 
measures undertaken to achieve substantive equality are within the 
parameters of section 9(2).95 The test first determines if the affirmative 
action measures "target persons or categories of persons who have been 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination", then it asks "whether the measure 
is designed to protect or advance such persons or categories of persons" 
and also "whether the measure promotes the achievement of equality".96 In 
this regard, as McGregor points out, the test requires a logical link between 
the measures taken and the goals of substantive equality, as well as 
addressing the unfair discrimination of the past. However, McGregor further 
                                            
89  Barnard (CC) paras 157-158. 
90  Barnard (CC) para 164. 
91  McGregor 2013 TSAR 653. 
92  McGregor 2013 TSAR 653. 
93  Barnard (CC). 
94  Barnard (CC) para 166. 
95  McGregor 2013 TSAR 654-655. 
96  Van Heerden para 37; also see McGregor 2013 TSAR 655. 
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argues that this is not flexible enough to allow a true measurement in 
determining substantive equality. She states that the test does not account 
for the "balancing" needed in terms of a consideration of (among other 
things) the particular context, diversity within the designated groups as well 
as representation and efficiency.97 
In Naidoo the SAPS affirmative action plan would probably comply with the 
rationality test on the surface but since the plan did not in fact achieve 
substantive equality it highlighted the shortcomings of this test as pointed 
out by McGregor. In this instance the SAPS target for employment together 
with the actual appointment are considered for the test. First, the measures 
adopted did target persons or categories of persons who had previously 
been disadvantaged, as it targeted members of the designated groups. The 
plan was designed to promote affirmative action and the appointment of a 
black male achieved the promotion of equality in that it promoted a member 
of the designated groups. The shortcoming is the failure to place the SAPS' 
particular circumstances in context and to act accordingly. The failure to 
appoint the Applicant, who was fully qualified, did not take into account the 
current male-dominated structure, or the fact that the targets set specifically 
excluded the Applicant from furthering her career and in fact created a 
barrier for advancement because her minority status was ignored.  
In Public Servants Association of South Africa v Minister of Justice,98
 
Swart 
J held that affirmative action "measures must be designed to achieve 
something. This denotes … a causal connection between the designed 
measures and the objectives".
 
Moseneke J disagreed and said that "it is 
sufficient if the measure carries a reasonable likelihood of meeting the 
end".99 However, as can be seen from Naidoo something more is needed 
than a reasonable likelihood of achieving the end in order to actually achieve 
this end. An appointment from the designated groups alone would achieve 
this but it would not achieve substantive equality because there was no 
consideration of the specific context. Pretorius has argued that an 
affirmative action measure can satisfy constitutional muster if it meets the 
requirements of substantive equality by complying with the rationality and 
fairness requirements of section 9 of the Constitution as well as the 
justifiability requirements of section 36 of the Constitution.100 This approach 
would certainly go a long way towards achieving the end goal. If the SAPS' 
affirmative action plan had applied the fairness test then it would have been 
clear that the Applicant was the correct choice for promotion. 
                                            
97  McGregor 2013 TSAR 654-655. 
98  Public Servants Association of South Africa v Minister of Justice 1997 3 SA 925 (T) 
989A-B. 
99  Van Heerden para 47. 
100  Pretorius 2001 Journal for Juridical Science 19. 
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The lack of clarity in the standard to be applied in affirmative action cases 
is unfortunate. This can be attributed in part to the contested nature of 
substantive equality.101 However, in applying an affirmative action policy an 
employer can be guided by various factors which will be discussed in more 
detail below, in an attempt to avoid further disadvantaging members of the 
designated groups. 
6.2 Representivity 
Since the goal of affirmative action is to "promote equal opportunity and fair 
treatment"102 and to "implement affirmative action measures to redress the 
disadvantage in employment experienced by designated groups"103 so that 
South Africa's diverse population is equitably represented in employment,104 
a closer look at the application of the SAPS' equity plan is warranted. The 
role of the employer is to ensure the development of the skills of the 
designated groups.105 In Naidoo the Applicant's promotion would ensure her 
advancement into management and create an opening for further skills 
development for other members of the designated groups, a measure 
necessary in the case of black females like the Applicant.106 
The issue of representivity in the application of affirmative action will always 
be part of the management prerogative. Management is better placed to 
identify its employment equity needs and formulate a plan which objectively 
promotes gender, race and disability representivity.107 However, 
management's prerogative still needs to be exercised in a manner that is 
fair and rational, failing which its actions will be scrutinised by the courts.108 
This therefore calls for a balance between representivity and skills 
efficiency, particularly where a member of the designated groups is less 
qualified.109 Having a plan with set targets provides an employer with just 
reasons for its choice of candidates who fall within the designated groups 
and where some may be more suitable than others.110 The process of 
distinguishing among members of the designated groups is influenced by 
the way in which the employer views these members, even though the EEA 
                                            
101  Albertyn 2015 SALJ 723. 
102  EEA s 2(a). 
103  EEA s 2(b). 
104  EEA s 2(b). 
105  EEA s 15(2)(d)(ii)). 
106  McGregor 2005 Codicillus 11; also see Naidoo paras 184, 194; and Solidarity obo 
Barnard v SAPS 2014 2 SA 1 (SCA) (hereinafter Barnard (SCA)). 
107  Dupper and Garber et al Essential Employment Discrimination Law 260. 
108  Solidarity obo Barnard v SAPS 2010 5 BLLR 561 (LC) (hereafter Barnard (LC)); see 
also Naidoo. 
109  McGregor 2003 SA Merc LJ 82, 85. 
110  Samuels v SAPS 2003 24 ILJ 1189 (BCA) 1196. 
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does not provide for this.111 Therefore it is the responsibility of the employer 
to recognise the difference in disadvantage of the designated groups and 
its impact on their representivity within the workforce, in order to achieve the 
ideal.112 The implementation of the equality right must consider "the 
underlying values of the Constitution" and must be something more than 
"formal equality".113 A strict reliance on "numbers" without consideration of 
the desirability of having a diversified workforce will achieve this token 
affirmative action.114 Therefore, in giving effect to the true purpose of 
affirmative action an employer must take into account that individuals and/or 
minorities could be overlooked and thereby prejudiced.115 
The equity plan’s target of "zero" Indian females resulted in an (albeit 
unintentional)116 token affirmative action plan, because it did not account for 
the impact on minorities such as the Applicant, who fell within the 
designated groups.117 The plan succeeded in creating an artificial barrier for 
this minority group within the designated groups, and did not promote 
adequate representation of the diverse population of South Africa.118 
Allowing an Indian female to move into higher ranks where Indian females 
are underrepresented would have promoted this representation. 
6.3 Multi-layered nature of disadvantage 
The nature of the disadvantage suffered by the designated groups also 
needs to be understood within the historical context of South Africa.119 
Inequality is still with us and is clearly visible between racial and gender 
groups120 and across minority groups. Despite this, the EEA limits the 
definition of disadvantage to race, gender and disability without taking into 
consideration multi-layered disadvantage, including factors such as socio-
economic inequality.121 The various nature of disadvantage was given 
recognition in the Barnard SCA judgement, where it was held that in the 
particular case of Captain Barnard, who was a white woman in a male-
dominated profession, and who "sit[s] at the intersection of privileged and 
under-privileged identities", the disadvantage that Barnard was vulnerable 
to meant that: 
                                            
111  McGregor 2005 Codicillus 9. 
112 McGregor 2005 Codicillus 9; also see Solidarity v Department of Correctional Services 
2015 ZALAC 6 (10 April 2015) (hereafter Solidarity [2015]).  
113  Barnard (SCA) para 26. 
114  Naidoo paras 184, 192. 
115  Mushariwa 2011 Obiter 439, 441. 
116 Naidoo para 190. 
117  Naidoo paras 184, 192. 
118 Barnard (SCA) para 19. 
119  Albertyn and Goldblatt "Equality" 35-1; also see McGregor 2006 Fundamina 87. 
120  Mokgoro 2003/2004 Alb L Rev 565. 
121 McGregor 2005 Codicillus 9. 
H PAPACOSTANTIS & M MUSHARIWA PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  16 
... she might suffer harm in unique ways compared to members of other groups, 
designated or not. A woman in her position had probably not suffered the unfair 
discrimination that black women did, but had also not enjoyed the privilege of 
white men. Her position and history of privilege are undeniably different from that 
of a black man and may require more promotion in some contexts and less in 
others.122 
More recently in the same case the Constitutional Court in South African 
Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard illustrated the role that multi-layered 
disadvantage can play in determining whether or not substantive equality is 
achieved. In Barnard's case the complainant was a white female who 
despite being fully qualified for the position she applied for123 and being the 
most suitable candidate by far124 was not offered the position.125 Ms Barnard 
as a female is a member of the designated groups, but because she is white 
she is also a member of the group privileged on the basis of race.126 In her 
particular circumstance the court found it equitable that she should not be 
appointed because of the degree of over representation of white females in 
that position.127 In her case, however, in contrast to that of Ms Naidoo, she 
was not barred from further promotion.128 
Pretorius argues that ranking different forms of disadvantage is not the best 
course of action when dealing with intersections within the designated 
groups.129 Nevertheless, considering the multi-layered disadvantage of 
members is still relevant in individual cases.130 For example in Motala v 
University of Natal131 multi-layered disadvantage played a role in 
determining the constitutionality of the exclusion of a member of the 
designated groups from admission to the medical school of the University 
of Natal. Here the court looked at multi-layered disadvantage in education 
between Indian and black students. Pretorius' argument for "appropriate 
contextualised consideration of different degrees of [in this case] 
educational disadvantage"132 accords with the court’s approval of the 
decision not to appoint Ms Barnard and its disapproval of the non-
appointment of the Applicant in Naidoo. 
  
                                            
122  Barnard (SCA) para 153. 
123 Barnard (CC) para 8. 
124  Barnard (CC) para 11. 
125  Barnard (CC) para 16. 
126  Barnard (CC) para 153. 
127  Barnard (CC) para 112. 
128  Barnard (CC) para 67. 
129  Pretorius 2001 Max Planck-Institut 434. 
130  Pretorius 2001 Max Planck-Institut 434. 
131  Motala v University of Natal 1995 3 BCLR 374 (D) para 838 B-F (hereafter Motala); 
see also Pretorius 2001 Max Planck-Institut 435. 
132  Pretorius 2001 Journal for Juridical Science 24. 
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6.4 Gender discrimination 
In addition to the Applicant's race she experienced further disadvantage 
based on her gender, particularly in a male-dominated profession.133 
Gender discrimination in the male-dominated police force is well 
documented.134 Women within the police force face various challenges as a 
result of their gender.135 The disadvantages include male police officers not 
accepting the authority of female officers, evidence of beliefs that female 
officers are incompetent, and the stereotyping of women, all of which result 
in an "intimidating working environment" for women.136 These attitudes are 
founded on the perception that it is not appropriate for women to work in a 
"man’s environment".137 The supposition is that women are not biologically 
or socially equipped to perform traditionally male jobs in areas such as 
policing and firefighting.138 
A reflection of the continuation of the male dominance in the workforce is 
apparent in this case in the promotion of a male candidate over the 
Applicant, despite there being no actual female representation of that 
particular minority from the designated groups.139 The black male 
candidate's promotion was based on targets that inaccurately reflected the 
demographics of the population,140 and also on the perception that she was 
less equipped to fill the position even though she had scored higher overall 
than the male candidate in the assessments.141 This is an apt example of 
the barriers that females would face even as part of the disadvantaged 
groups as a whole.142 A truly representative workforce will reflect the goals 
of affirmative action together with individuals' right to be treated fairly. An 
employment equity plan must therefore be flexible enough to accommodate 
this.143 
  
                                            
133  McGregor 2005 Codicillus 5.  
134  See Bezuidenhout and Theron 2000 Acta Criminologica 19; also see Morrison 2002 
Annual Journal of South African Association of Women Graduates 24. 
135  Morrison 2005 Acta Criminologica 20. 
136  Morrison 2005 Acta Criminologica 20. 
137  Morrison 2005 Acta Criminologica 22. 
138 Morrison 2005 Acta Criminologica 21. 
139  Naidoo para 191. 
140  Naidoo paras 183, 204. 
141  Naidoo paras 36, 107. 
142  Naidoo para 209. 
143  Mushariwa 2011 Obiter 443; also see Du Preez v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development 2006 5 SA 592 (E) para 30; and Barnard (CC) para 100. 
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6.5 Minority status within the designated groups as a type of 
disadvantage 
Minority status within the designated groups, for which there is no uniform, 
agreed definition, is another factor not accounted for by the EEA.144 Minority 
groups "can be defined in terms of age, sexuality, sexual preference, 
gender, religion, culture, race, or ethnicity".145 Such a group is held to be a 
distinct group within a larger society.146 A minority group is also "numerically 
inferior to the rest of the population of a state and, therefore, in a non-
dominant position".147 It is noted, however, that "minority status is not 
always based on number and is sometimes based on inferior social and 
political position".148 Using the national statistics on the demographics of the 
economically-active population, Indians are clearly in the minority in the 
larger designated group of blacks. 
Due to the manner in which the equity plan of the SAPS was applied, it can 
be argued that the applicant suffered multiple layers of disadvantage: first, 
by virtue of her race; second, by virtue of her gender, particularly in such a 
male-dominated profession; and third, due to her membership of a minority 
group within the designated groups. The lack of recognition of the possibility 
of multi-layered disadvantage being experienced by some members of 
designated groups resulted in the setting of a “zero” target for Indian 
females for the position applied for by the Applicant.149 
It is thus necessary to consider inequality on broad and narrow grounds 
alike such as from the group perspective, and “individual and community” 
inequality within the group or community.150 The position of Indians and 
more specifically Indian females as a minority group within the larger 
designated groups needs to be considered carefully within the SAPS 
specifically, so that potential candidates are not discouraged from joining 
the profession.151 
It is apparent that the issue of representivity in the case of minority groups 
within the designated groups must be considered in more specific terms as 
opposed to the broader terms currently employed. A recent illustration of 
this is to be found in the case of Solidarity v the Department of Correctional 
                                            
144  Moosa 2002 Codicillus 41. 
145  Mochwanaesi, Steyn and Van der Walt 2005 SAJE 287. 
146  Mochwanaesi, Steyn and Van der Walt 2005 SAJE 287; also see Moosa 2002 
Codicillus 41. 
147  Mochwanaesi, Steyn and Van der Walt 2005 SAJE 287. 
148  Moosa 2002 Codicillus 41. 
149  Naidoo paras 135, 187. 
150  Albertyn 2011 Stell LR 591, 595. 
151 Nthuli 2015. 
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Services,152 where the court found that the employer's focus on national 
demographics, without considering the uniquely different demographics 
within the Western Cape, resulted in unfair discrimination against coloured 
applicants within the department. The regional demographics were 
significantly different from the national demographics. Thus the court held 
that in the context of the Western Cape the department needed to consider 
both national and regional demographics.153 This judgement is due to have 
the greatest impact within provinces like the Western Cape where the 
regional demographics differ from the national demographics within the 
black group.154 According to the Department of Labour, 51 per cent of the 
economically-active population of the Western Cape is coloured, with the 
African population comprising 33.9 per cent, followed by the white 
population with 14.8 per cent and lastly the Indian population with 0.3 per 
cent.155 
Both Solidarity and the Department of Correctional Services appealed the 
decisions for varying reasons.156 Solidarity appealed the decision in order 
to get substantive relief for the employees, whereas the Correctional 
Services Department appealed the decision as to whether they were 
mandated to consider both national and regional demographics in the 
implementation of their employment equity policy. Focusing on this 
particular issue, the court dismissed the Correctional Services Departments' 
appeal, holding that "in the construction of a non-racial and non-sexist 
nation, the relationship between regional and national demographics 
requires nuance and flexibility".157 This could be applied to the Applicant's 
situation, considering the absence of Indian females in high-ranking 
positions and their generally low representation within the SAPS. 
6.6 A situation-sensitive approach to affirmative action 
The diversity of the population and diversity within the workplace 
necessitate that each case be judged in terms of its own specific facts. This 
case, thus, demonstrates the need for employers to seriously consider the 
impact of their decisions in implementing affirmative action not just on 
members of the designated groups but more so on the minority members 
                                            
152  Solidarity v Department of Correctional Services 2014 35 ILJ 504 (hereafter Solidarity 
(2014)). 
153  Solidarity (2014) paras 45-46. 
154  Solidarity (2014) para 46. 
155  Department of Labour 2013 http://www.labour.gov.za. 
156  Solidarity [2015]. 
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within.158 There cannot be "naked preference"159 of some members of the 
designated groups to the exclusion of others. Taking a situation-sensitive 
approach to affirmative action would also ensure that the employer 
recognises the different disadvantages experienced by members of the 
designated groups, some which are historical but others of which are current 
experiences of disadvantage created by the institutional culture of an 
organisation or a badly drafted employment equity plan.160 
Such an approach is surely within the ambit of the Constitution and would 
go a long way towards addressing the discrimination of the past and placing 
all South Africans on an "equal footing". The courts are increasingly 
following the "situation-sensitive" approach in scrutinising the facts of each 
case particularly in their decisions about unfair discrimination. This 
approach is evident in the decision of Barnard (SCA), which favoured a 
"flexible but situation-sensitive approach" towards affirmative action to 
ensure fairness.161 
In addition, in adopting a situation-sensitive approach, the impact of the 
action taken (or not taken) in relatioin to the aggrieved party is also a factor 
to be considered by the employer.162 In Barnard (SCA)  the court found that 
the employer's over-emphasis on representivity on the basis of race 
effectively excluded Captain Barnard, even though she was a member of 
the designated groups due to her gender, resulting in unfair discrimination 
against her. The court thus highlighted that "a situation-sensitive approach 
is indispensable because of shifting patterns of hurtful discrimination and 
stereotypical response in our evolving democratic society".163 Even though 
Barnard (CC) has reversed this decision, the court's approach in 
recognising the multi-layered disadvantage that can be suffered by 
members of the designated groups is in itself practising a “situation-
sensitive” approach. 
It is now 15 years since the inception of the EEA, and progress in affirmative 
action is slow or non-existent.164 Focus cannot be only on inclusion of the 
designated groups but also on the creation of a workforce that is 
transformed by breaking down both visible and invisible barriers to equality 
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in the workplace, as well as creating an enabling environment for members 
of the designated groups to reach their full potential within the workplace.165 
7 Conclusion 
It is clear that the identified beneficiaries of affirmative action are not equally 
placed in relation to one another in their ability to compete for employment 
or promotion within the workforce in a situation where employment equity 
plans do not employ a "situation-sensitive" approach. The EEA does not 
adequately account for these differences in the experience of disadvantage. 
It is important that an employer, when implementing employment equity, 
does not reinforce existing inequality within and across the groups. The 
implementation of affirmative action without consideration of these factors 
can effectively bar the advancement of minority groups within the 
designated groups and create new barriers to advancement, as effectively 
shown in the Naidoo case. 
To fully achieve the aims of affirmative action, to break down the barriers to 
employment still affecting members of the designated groups, to achieve a 
fully representative workforce, and to transform the workplace into an area 
governed by principles of substantive equality calls for employers to adopt 
a situation-sensitive approach. The consideration of the context and all of 
the factors discussed in this note, together with recognition of the existence 
of multi-layered disadvantage, is called for in order to achieve substantial 
equality in the labour context. 
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